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Abstract
The present study tries to investigate the causal model of  religious violence 
using SEM (Structural Equation Modeling) approach. Previous quantitative 
research in social movements and political violence suggests that there are, at 
least, three factors, that caused violent collective actions, including religious 
violence: 1) the more fundamentalist people are, the more likely they justify 
violence, 2) people with lower trust in government is more likely to justify 
violence, and 3) opposing the second argument: only people with low trust 
in government and high political efficacy are more likely to justify violence. 
Based on the data of  343 respondents, the activists of  Front Pembela Islam, 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, this study confirms that the more 
fundamentalist people are, the more likely they are to justify violence regardless 
of  their organizational affiliations. On the contrary, this study does not 
support the argument for the relationship between trust in government and 
violence. Similarly, the relationship between violence and the latent interaction 
of  trust and political efficacy is not supported by the data. Therefore, this 
study suggests that fundamentalism, a type of  religiosity, is a salient factor to 
explain religious violence. 
[Penelitian ini berusaha mengkaji sebab kekerasan keagamaan dengan 
menggunakan pendekatan Model Persamaan Struktur (SEM). Penelitian 
1 The original version of  this article was presented in absentia at the International 
Research Conference on Muhammadiyah (IRCM) 2012 “Discourse on the Search for a 
Renewed Identity of  Muhammadiyah for its Post-Centennial Era” University of  
Muhammadiyah Malang (UMM), November 29 - December 2, 2012.
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kuantitatif  terdahulu dalam bidang gerakan sosial dan kekerasan politik 
menunjukkan bahwa setidaknya ada tiga faktor yang diduga kuat menjadi 
penyebab kekerasan kolektif, seperti kekerasan agama, yaitu: 1) semakin 
fundamentalis seseorang, maka ia akan semakin cenderung menyetujui 
pernggunaan cara kekerasan, 2) semakin rendah kepercayaan seseorang 
terhadap pemerintah, maka ia akan semakin menyetujui penggunaan 
kekerasan, 3) berbeda dengan pendapat ke-dua, hanya orang yang rendah 
kepercayaanya kepada pemerintah, namun mempunyai semangat politik 
tinggi, yang akan menyetujui penggunaan cara-cara kekerasan. Berdasarkan 
pada data yang diambil dari 343 responden dari para aktivis, Front Pembela 
Islam, Muhammadiyah dan Nahdlatul Ulama, penelitian ini mengkonfirmasi 
bahwa semakin fundamentalis seseorang, maka ia akan semakin cenderung 
menyetujui kekerasan, terlepas dari afiliasi organisasi mereka. Namun 
demikian, penelitian ini tidak mendukung hubungan antara kepercayaan 
terhadap pemerintah dan kekerasan. Demikian juga, hubungan antara 
kekerasan dan interaksi antara kepercayaan pemerintah dan semangat 
politik tidak dapat dibuktikan dari data dalam penelitian ini. Oleh karena 
itu, penelitian ini menyimpulkan bahwa fundamentalisme, sebagai salah satu 
bentuk keagamaan, merupakan faktor yang sangat penting dalam menjelaskan 
kekerasan keagamaan. ]
Keywords:  fundamentalism, trust in government, political efficacy, 
religious violence, Structural Equation Modeling
A. Introduction: Examining Religious Violence
There are various perspectives of  looking at political violence, 
especially religious violence. There is no single answer to the question 
of  why this violence occurs. Several studies look at violence by focusing 
on the political environments. They suggest that the characteristics 
of  regimes or states are considered to be more determining of  social 
movement’s outcomes than other environmental factors, or more over 
the characteristics of  the actors. In this light, authoritarianism or state 
repression is often considered to be the cause of  the emergence of  
violent movements. A group resorts to violence because the way and the 
process toward normal pacific competition have been blocked.2  Harsh 
repression blocks moderate tactics and subsequently tends to radicalize 
2 Earl Conteh-Morgan, Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and 
Cases of  Violent Conflicts (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 14–5.
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the movement and pushes tactics toward violence.3 
Other studies look at internal or endogenous factors of  the 
movements, such as culture, meaning construction, ideology and other 
factors that relate to minds and emotions of  the movement or actors. For 
example, many social movement scholars argue that political violence is 
mainly symbolic. Therefore, in analyzing violence, cultural and emotional 
effects are more important than the material damage caused by violence.4 
Juergensmeyer explores the relationship between religion and violence 
through culture. He argues that violence is a form of  public performance 
symbolizing ability to terrorize the community. Religion plays a role in 
legitimizing the violence and provides the cosmic war that makes the 
perpetrators believe that they are conducting a holy mission. Even though 
religion does not always provides moral justification for violence, this 
kind of  alliance between religion and violence can be found in almost 
every major religious traditions, such as Christianity, Islam, Judaism, 
Hindu, Sikh and Buddhism.5
Other studies prefer to look at political violence as part of  the 
discourse in society. This is because political violence exists within the 
discourse. For example, in the case of  radicalization of  the religious 
movements in El Salvador, Shortell looks at the process of  radicalization 
through the sermon of  Romero. He looks at the techniques of  describing 
and explaining the rhetorical strategies by which meaning is deployed in 
the struggle against the state. Therefore, religious ideology or discourse 
in this case is not merely theological but it also represents the process 
of  radicalization of  movements in El Salvador.6
Based on this brief  literature reviews, many studies still ignore 
the socio-environmental aspects that relate to the characteristics of  
3 Timothy Shortell, “Radicalization of  Religious Discourse in El Salvador: 
The Case of  Oscar A. Romero”, Sociology of  Religion, vol. 62, no. 1 (2001), pp. 87–103. 
Paul Almeida, Waves of  Protest: Popular Struggle in El Salvador, 1925–2005 (Minneapolis: 
University of  Minnesota Press, 2008). Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Introduction: Islamic 
Activism, a Social Movement Theory”, in Islamic Activism, a Social Movement Theory 
Approach, ed. by Quintan Wiktorowicz (Bloomington Indiana: Indiana University Press, 
2004), pp. 1–36. Patricia Steinhoff  and Gilda Zwerman, “Introduction to the Special 
Issue on Political Violence”, Qualitative Sociology, vol. 31, no. 3 (2008), pp. 213–20.
4 Donatella Della Porta, “Research on Social Movements and Political Violence”, 
Qualitative Sociology, vol. 31, no. 3 (2008), pp. 221–30.
5 Mark Juergensmeyer, Terror in the Mind of  God: The Global Rise of  Religious 
Violence (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 2003), pp. 5–18.
6 Shortell, “Radicalization of  Religious Discourse in El Salvador”, pp. 87–103.
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individuals who perpetrate violence. Therefore, this study focuses on 
examining individual characteristics of  movement’s activists that explain 
the adoption of  violent means using a quantitative structural equation 
modeling approach. 
Some of  the most challenging arguments in quantitative research 
are that the way of  people perceive their religions and their states or 
governments affects the movement’s outcomes. More specifically, they are 
fundamentalism, political trust and political efficacy.  In addition, there are 
other characteristics that are often assumed to be the causes of  political 
violence, such as poverty, low level of  education and unemployment. 
However, there is still lack of  study that confirms this assumption. 
Therefore, this study will only assess the relationships between 
the variable of  political violence and the variables of  fundamentalism, 
trust in government and political efficacy in order to assess the causal 
model of  religious violence.  First, fundamentalism may be the most 
conspicuous factor that is often accused as the source of  religious 
violence; even if  the violence does not appear to be religious. Even 
though some scholars7 disagree with this idea, many others still believe 
that the relationship between fundamentalism and religious violence is 
real.  For example, in Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s study, the relationship 
between fundamentalism and hostility towards homosexuality is quite 
high, with the correlation coefficient of  .50.8 Moaddel and Karanbenich 
found that the more fundamentalist people are, the more likely they 
are to be fatalistic and feel insecure.9 Similarly, Rothschild found that 
among Americans, fundamentalism is associated with greater support 
for significant military interventions.10
Second, in addition to fundamentalism, a number of  earlier 
7 Jajang Jahroni, Defending the Majesty of  Islam: Indonesia’s Front Pembela Islam, 
1998-2003 (Chiang May, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2008); Al-Zastrouw Ng, Gerakan 
Islam Simbolik: Politik Kepentingan FPI (Yogyakarta: LKiS, 2006).
8 Bob Altemeyer and Bruce Hunsberger, “Research: A Revised Religious 
Fundamentalism Scale: The Short and Sweet of  It”, The International Journal for the 
Psychology of  Religion, vol. 14, no. 1 (2004), pp. 47–54.
9 Mansoor Moaddel and Stuart A. Karabenick, “Religious Fundamentalism 
Among Young Muslims in Egypt and Saudi Arabia”, Social Forces, vol. 86, no. 4 (2008), 
pp. 1675–710.
10 Zachary K. Rothschild, Abdolhossein Abdollahi, and Tom Pyszczynski, 
“Does Peace Have a Prayer? The Effect of  Mortality Salience, Compassionate Values, 
and Religious Fundamentalism on Hostility toward Out-groups”, Journal of  Experimental 
Social Psychology, vol. 45, no. 4 (2009), pp. 816–27.
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studies indicate that political discontent or trust in government and 
political efficacy are associated with violence and radicalization. Miller 
and Zimmermann argue that the readiness to engage in violence will 
depend on the degree of  trust in political authority.11 Similarly, Gamson 
distinguishes three types of  political activities which are used to influence 
the state: persuasion, inducement and constraint (physical violence). All 
of  these types relate to the level of  trust in government. People who 
have a high trust in government would be likely to use persuasion; those 
who have a neutral position towards the government, would be likely to 
use inducement; and those who have a low trust, would be likely to use 
constraint or violence. In addition, he adds that those who use violence 
should also have a high efficacy.12
Similar to Gamson, others argue that people with high scores of  
political efficacy but low scores of  trust in government tend to resort to 
violent political actions.13 In contrast, others argue that people with low 
trust in government and low level of  political efficacy are susceptible to 
radical or revolutionary appeals.14 However, these two arguments can be 
tested at the same time by creating an interaction variable between trust 
and political efficacy and then looking at the results of  those interaction in 
relations to the dependent variable of  violence, as it is done in this study. 
Based on the above brief  literature reviews, the hypothesized model 
of  religious violence can be formulated as follows:
H1a: The more fundamentalist people are, the more likely they will justify 
violence. If  this is true, then go to H1b and H1c.
H1b: The activists of  the nonviolent groups (Muhammadiyah and NU) 
will be less likely to be fundamentalist than those of  the violent group 
(FPI).15
11 Arthur H. Miller, “Political Issues and Trust in Government: 1964–1970*”, 
American Political Science Review, vol. 68, no. 3 (1974), pp. 951–72; Zimmermann Ekkart, 
Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions: Theories and Research, vol. 79 (Boston, Mass: G. 
K. Hall, 1985).
12 William A. Gamson, Power and Discontent (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1968).
13 Jeffery M. Paige, “Political Orientation and Riot Participation”, American 
Sociological Review, vol. 36, no. 5 (1971), pp. 810–20.
14 William Kornhauser, The Politics of  Mass Society (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959); 
H. Edward Ransford, “Isolation, Powerlessness, and Violence: A Study of  Attitudes 
and Participation in the Watts Riot”, American Journal of  Sociology, vol. 73, no. 5 (1968), 
pp. 581–91.
15 H1b is used to reconfirm H1a. If  H1a is true, then H1b is expected to be true.
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H1c: The relationship between fundamentalism and violence will be 
stronger for the activist of  FPI than those of  Muhammadiyah and NU.16
H1d: The activists of  the nonviolent groups (Muhammadiyah and NU) 
will be less likely to justify violence than those of  the violent group (FPI).17
H2a: People who have a lower trust in government will be more likely to 
justify violence. If  this is true, then go to H2c.
H2b: People who have a low trust in government but high political efficacy 
will be likely to justify violence. If  this is true then go to H2c and H2d.
H2c: The activists of  Muhammadiyah and NU will be likely to have a 
higher trust in government than those of  FPI.18
H2d: The activists of  Muhammadiyah and NU will be likely to have a 
lower political efficacy than those of  FPI.19
B. Measuring and Scaling of  the Latent Variables 
1. Fundamentalism
Originally the term fundamentalism referred to a group of  
conservative American Protestants in the early 1900s. They were 
fundamentalists in the sense that they considered themselves to be the 
people selected to preserve and protect the fundamentals of  Christian 
faith from the liberal ideas, such as Darwinism and modernism.20 More 
recently, the term fundamentalism has been used to identify a type of  
religiosity that emphasizes a return to traditional values or a glorious 
past and an accompanying sense of  restoration of  religious traditions. 
Therefore, the term fundamentalism is no longer confined to Christianity. 
It has been expanded into other religions, not only the Abrahamic 
religions but also Hinduism and Buddhism.21 
16 H1c is used to reconfirm H1a. If  H1a is true, then H1c is expected to be true.
17 H1b is used to reconfirm H1a. If  H1a is true, then H1b is expected to be true.
18 H2c is used to reconfirm H2a and H2b. If  H2a and H2b are true, then H2c 
is expected to be true.
19 H2d is used to reconfirm H2a and H2b. If  H2a and H2b are true, then H2d 
is expected to be true.
20 Paul D. Numrich, “Fundamentalisms and American Pluralism”, Journal of  
Ecumenical Studies, vol. 42, no. 1 (2007), p. 9.
21 Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, “Introduction: A Sacred Cosmos, 
Scandalous Code, Defiant Society”, in Fundamentalisms and Society: Reclaiming the Sciences, the 
Family, and Education, ed. by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University 
of  Chicago Press, 1993), p. 5.
419Al-Jāmi‘ah, Vol. 53, No. 2, 2015 M/1437 H
Causal Analysis of  Religious Violence
Scholars have different opinions on the definitions of  
fundamentalism, or what may constitute fundamentalism. That is 
may be the source of  why scholars have different opinions about the 
relationship between violence and fundamentalism.  Some emphasize 
their concepts on people’s religious beliefs, like the truth of  one’s 
religion, the relationship with God and treating religious texts; while 
others emphasize on the manifestations of  people’s attitude towards 
religion. These differences can be seen in how both groups define 
“fundamentalism” as follows.  
First, Altemeyer and Hunsberger focus their concept on religious 
beliefs. They define fundamentalism as follows: 
One set of  religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, 
basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that 
this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of  evil which must 
be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according 
to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of  the past; and those who 
believe and follow these fundamental teaching have a special relationship 
with deity. 22  
Second, other scholars define fundamentalism in a broader way, not 
merely based on the religious beliefs. As Berger argues, fundamentalism 
should be defined by its cognitive style. Both non fundamentalist and 
fundamentalist adherents share the same beliefs, but they affirm these 
beliefs in different ways; the former shows a flexible and moderate manner 
and the latter exhibits an uptight and militant manner.23 Similarly, other 
scholars define fundamentalism as follows:
An identifiable pattern of  religious militancy in which self-styled true 
believers attempt to arrest the erosion of  religious identity by outsiders, 
fortify the borders of  religious community and create viable alternatives 
to secular structures and processes.24
The present study considers that the first definition of  
fundamentalism, which only considers “belief ” factor, is problematic. 
This study, therefore, uses the second definition of  fundamentalism in 
22 Bob Altemeyer and Bruce Hunsberger, “Authoritarianism, Religious 
Fundamentalism, Quest, and Prejudice”, The International Journal for the Psychology of  
Religion, vol. 2, no. 2 (1992), p. 118.
23 Rebecca Joyce Frey, Fundamentalism (New York: Facts On File, 2007), p. vi.
24 Gabriel A. Almond, R. Scott Appleby, and Emmanuel Sivan, Strong Religion: 
The Rise of  Fundamentalism Around The World (Chicago: University of  Chicago Press, 
2003), p. 17.
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order to develop a scale of  fundamentalism. In addition, the second 
definition of  fundamentalism does not ignore the aspect of  belief, as 
can be seen in the following traits of  fundamentalist:
 ● Reactivity means reactive attitudes towards something that is considered 
as degeneration of  a tradition, or protective and defensive attitudes 
towards religion beliefs. Fundamentalists, therefore, perceive threat of  
their religion from other religions, ethnic groups, the state, or more 
liberal groups of  the same religion. 
 ● Dualistic thinking means a black-white approach to life. Everything 
is considered as good or otherwise evil, or pure and contaminated. 
 ● Absolutist interpretation of  scripture means strict reading of  the holy 
books, or in some cases, accepted traditions.    
 ● An apocalyptic view means a belief  that the sacred texts contain hidden 
mysteries, including historical secrets, such as the concept of  the 
Messiah and Dajjal (the big impostor). 
 ● Belief  in chosenness means that Fundamentalists believe in their own 
specialness as the defenders of  the religion. Even though, most 
fundamentalist groups consist of  only a small number of  people 
compared to the mainstream groups, they tirelessly pursue their goals, 
opposing what they believe to be the prevailing madness within the 
religion and within the world today.
 ● Selective emphasis means that fundamentalists focus only certain parts 
of  their religion traditions, and certain aspects of  modernity as their 
target of  attacks. 
Other factors, such as separation from the world, charismatic style 
of  leadership, and strict behavior of  controls, are other fundamentalist 
characteristic at the group level.25 Therefore, these traits (point 7) are 
not used to measure fundamentalism in this study, which focuses on the 
individual level. Implementing the above concept of  fundamentalism, 
the Figure 1 shows items used to measure the level of  fundamentalism 
and their theoretical bases.
2. Trust in Government
Trust in government is about citizens’ effective orientation toward, 
and evaluation of, the government. The scale of  trust runs from high 
trust to low trust (high distrust or cynicism). High trust indicates that 
the government or public servants meet the expectation of  the citizens, 
25  Frey, Fundamentalism.
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Figure 1: Indicators (Observed Variables) of  Fundamentalism 
Coding Items/Indicators Theoretical Base
F1 We do not need to re-interpret what is clearly and literally stated 
in the al-Quran because it is flawless, for example the verses of  
the unequal proportion of  inheritance between son and daughter.
Absolutism
F2 Whenever knowledge/science and al-Quran conflict, science 
must be wrong; and we do not need to compromise them.
Absolutism
F3 Currently the activities of  Christianization targeting Muslim 
in Indonesia have become a serious threat to our Muslim 
community.
Reactivity
F4 The Islamic liberal groups, like JIL (Jaringan Islam Liberal) have 
gone too far from the real tenets of  Islam and potentially harm 
the true beliefs of  Muslim community of  Indonesia.
Reactivity
F5 Muslims of  Indonesia is in a state of  serious danger because of  
the widespread of  corruptions, pornography, prostitutions, drugs 
and other immoralities
Reactivity
F6 Currently, I feel that I am obliged to do something to protect 
Islam/Muslim society from such immorality because many 
Muslims tend to ignore such problems.
Feeling being 
Chosen
F7 To deal with these problems, the government should prioritize 
to solve moral problems rather than other problems because 
immorality (the moral problem) is the source of  all problems.
Selective 
emphasis
F8 According to Islam, a woman cannot be a leader, such as 
president, governor and mayor.
Absolutism, 
Selective 
emphasis
F9 According to Islam, a woman cannot be a judge. Absolutism, 
Selective 
emphasis
F10 A Muslim must not vote for female candidates for president 
or governor.
Absolutism, 
Selective 
emphasis
F11 The chronic problems of  corruption, pornography and other 
widespread of  immoralities as well as the continuous natural 
disasters in Indonesia are signs about the closeness of  the end 
of  the world.
Apocalyptical 
Views
F12 The Quran and the Hadith have already predicted the appearance 
of  Dajjal (the imposter and damage carrier). I believe that the 
president of  the USA and the prime minister Israel are the Dajjal.
Apocalyptical 
Views
F13 Indonesia is a secular state because its constitution is not based 
on a religion (Islam or the Quran and Hadith).
Dualistic thinking
F14 Muslims make up the majority of  the Indonesian population. 
Therefore, state constitutions should be based on Islamic shariah 
(al-Quran and al-Sunnah).
Dualistic thinking
Note: The answers for these statements use 7 points of  the Likert scale (1=strongly 
disagree to 7= strongly agree); and 7 indicate highest level of  fundamentalism.
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Figure 2: Indicators (Observed Variables) of  Trust in Government
Coding Items/Indicators
T1 How much of  the time can you trust the SBY Administration?
T2 How much of  the time can you trust the Provincial/Local Government?
T3 How much of  the time can you trust the Police?
T4 How much of  the time can you trust the Courts (Pengadilan)?
T5 How much of  the time can you trust the Prosecutor General 
(Kejaksaan)?
T6 How much of  the time can you trust the People of  Congress/Parliament 
(MPR/DPR)?
Note: The answer for these questions will be 1 = never 2 = only some of  the time 3 
= most of  the time 4 = always 0 = don’t know. The score of  1 indicates low trust 
in government and 4 indicates high trust in government. The score of  zero (0) is 
treated as a missing value and recoded as -9
while low trust indicates that the government’s functions and outputs 
do not meet the citizens’ expectations or norms.26 There are at least two 
approaches used to measure trust in government. The first approach 
emphasizes people’s self-identification of  their trust in the government’s 
work, or in how the government functions. The second approach 
emphasizes people’s self-identification on their trust in the government’s 
institutions. For example, the question is “how much of  the time can 
you trust the police institution.”27 
For the purpose of  practical reasons, this study only uses the 
second strategy. Therefore, the items of  trust in government will contain 
people’s self-identification of  their trust in the government’s institutions. 
However, the questions or the statements and the scales of  answers 
will be adjusted and added, so that they will be more appropriate to the 
context of  Indonesia. Thus, the questions about trust will be as follows.
3. Political Efficacy
Political efficacy is often defined as the feeling that people can have 
an impact upon the political process. Thus, efficacious individuals will 
feel that they can influence the political process or how the government 
26 Gamson, Power and Discontent, pp. 951–72.
27 Judith Torney-Purta and Wendy Klandl Richardson, “Trust in Government 
and Civic Engagement Among Adolescents in Australia, England, Greece, Norway, and 
the United States.”, Conference Papers American Political Science Association Annual Meeting 
(2002) (Boston, MA: 2001, 2002), pp. 1–19; Paige, “Political Orientation”, pp. 810–20.
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functions.28 Currently, in the literature of  political science, the dimension 
of  political efficacy developed by a sociologist, William A. Gamson, has 
been expanded.   Efficacy is, therefore, not only a measure of  beliefs 
about one’s competence to participate or influence the political process, 
which is called “internal efficacy,” but also beliefs about a government’s 
responsiveness to citizens’ demands, which is called “external efficacy.”29
However, for the purpose of  this study, I will use the concept 
of  efficacy proposed by Gamson based on two reasons. First, the later 
definition of  political efficacy (internal and external) is developed in order 
to explain voting behavior or conventional political participation rather 
than more general socio-political participation. Second, the operational 
definition of  external efficacy to some extent overlaps with the indicators 
of  political trust used in this study. For example, one item of  external 
efficacy is “under our form of  government, the people have the final say 
about how the country is run, no matter who is in office;” this statement 
28  Torney-Purta and Richardson, “Trust in Government”.
29  Stephen C. Craig, Richard G. Niemi, and Glenn E. Silver, “Political Efficacy 
and Trust: A Report on the NES Pilot Study Items”, Political Behavior, vol. 12, no. 3, 
pp. 289–314.
Figure 3: Indicators (Observed Variables) of  Political Efficacy
Coding Items/Indicators
Ef1 I consider myself  well-qualified to participate in politics (even if  now 
you are not interested in participating in politics). 
Ef2 I think that I am as well-informed about politics and government as 
most people. 
Ef3 I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of  the important political 
issues facing our country right now
Ef4 Other people seem to have an easier time understanding compli cated 
issues than I do.* 
Ef5 I feel that I could do as good a job as people in the government of  
parliament. 
Ef6 I often don’t feel sure of  myself  when talking with other people about 
politics and government.* 
Note: 
 ● The answers for these statements use 7 points of  the Likert scale (1=strongly 
disagree to 7= strongly agree); and 7 indicate highest level of  Efficacy (political 
efficacy).
 ● The statement with * are scored in reverse, so that the higher score indicates 
higher efficacy.
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may overlap with the above indicators of  trust. In addition to that, it is 
the Gamson’s concept of  political efficacy that more closely discusses the 
relationship between political efficacy, trust and violence. Figure 3 lists 
the items that are used to measure political efficacy (internal) adopted 
from the previous studies by Craig and Gamson.30
4. Violent Attitude: Willingness to Employ Violence for the Ends
The violence used in this study refers to the attitude of  people 
towards the violent actions done some Muslim groups in Indonesia, 
such as violence against brothels, nightclubs, Ahmadiyah group and 
Shi’it community in Madura. This type of  violence can be categorized 
under collective violence as contentious politics.31 Some also call this 
kind of  violence simply political violence. Unlike violence in general, 
which is mostly random if  not criminal, political violence (religious 
violence) is deployed for purposes like overthrowing a tyrannical regime 
and redefining social justice and equity.32 Therefore, most of  the time, 
political violence is justified by the perpetrators’ group.
This technique is being used because it is not feasible to measure 
a violent behavior, such as asking people about their involvement in 
political violence, the present study will only measure violent attitudes. It 
measures how the Muslim activists (FPI, Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul 
Ulama) justify the use of  violent means for the socio-political or religious 
ends, as can be seen in Figure 4. The complete hypothesized model for 
these indicators of  the variables of  fundamentalism, trust in government, 
political efficacy and willingness to employ violence (violence)  can be 
seen in Appendix 1.
C. Modeling Religious Violence
Based on the hypothesized model (Appendix 1), the data was 
estimated using Mplus software and the result can be summarized and 
interpreted as follows (the result can also be seen in Appendix 2).  Using 
LMS (Latent Moderated Structural) approach (or XWITH in Mplus), the 
30 Craig, Niemi, and Silver, “Political Efficacy and Trust”; Gamson, Power 
and Discontent, p. 42.
31 Charles Tilly, The Politics of  Collective Violence (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), pp. 3, 26.
32 David E. Apter, “Political Violence in Analytical Perspective”, in The 
Legitimization of  Violence, ed. by David E. Apter (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 1997), pp. 
11–23.1997
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model was estimated in two steps in order to evaluate the goodness of  fit. 
First, the model was estimated without including the latent interactions 
(trust-efficacy and fundamentalism-group) or the dashed paths.   The 
analysis with maximum likelihood (ML) estimation converged to an 
admissible solution.  Values of  the selected fit indexes for this model 
are Akaike (AIC) = 30909.695, Chi-square or χ2 (475) = 1093.353 with 
p < 0.000, RMSEA = 0.062 (fair fit), CFI = 0.912 (fair fit), and SRMR 
= 0.080 (fair fit).
The high value of  Chi-square, which is not desired, may indicate 
that the hypothesized model and observed covariances are statistically 
difference with p < 0.000. However, the Chi-square is overly sensitive 
to sample size and multivariate deviations of  normality; in fact, the 
sample size of  343 in this study is relatively high, which is larger than 
200. Therefore, this study renders the chi-square value less important 
for evaluation of  model fit. Instead, this study uses RMSEA, CFI and 
SRMR values to evaluate the model; they indicate that the hypothesized 
model and observed covariances are about the same.
Second, the full model (with the interactions) was estimated. The 
result of  the second estimation did not produce Chi-square, RMSEA and 
Figure 4 Indicators (Observed Variables) of  Violent Attitudes
Coding Items/Indicators
V1 The Gay and Lesbian groups have publicly tried to conduct some 
activities like seminars and beauty contest for gay people. Therefore, 
it is normal for society to use force or any violent means in order to 
stop their activities.
V2 Any Muslims who bluntly declare that there is a prophet after 
Muhammad are considered to be infidels/apostates and the enemy of  
Islam; their blood is allowed to be shed.
V3 There have been some churches built without legal consent. Therefore, 
it is okay if  some people force those churches to close, including with 
some necessary violent means.
V4 Prostitution has been legalized and localized in many cities. We have 
no other way out to stop prostitutions, but to stop them with the use 
of  force, including some necessary violent actions.
V5 The problems of  gambling and drinking have been growing in 
Indonesian society. We have no other way out to stop them except with 
the use of  force, including some necessary violent actions
Note: The answers for these statements use 7 points of  the Likert scale (1=strongly 
disagree to 7= strongly agree); and 7 indicate the highest level of  violent attitudes 
(Violence).
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CFI. Instead it reported the Akaike (AIK) value to evaluate the model. 
The value of  AIC is 30862.417. This value is smaller than the value in the 
previous model by 47.278 (30909.695 - 30862.417).  As it is commonly 
accepted, the model with the smaller Akaike (AIC) is considered as a 
better model. Therefore, the second model with interactions (the model in 
Appendix 1 or Model 2 in Appendix 2) is better than the model without 
interactions (Model 1 in Appendix 2).
In addition, Appendix 2 shows that the estimations of  Model 1 
and Model 2 are almost similar, or their parameter estimates are stable 
in that their factor loadings, path coefficients and p-values are relatively 
the same. Those indicate that the estimations are good and consistent. 
However, Model 2 may give more precise parameter estimates than that 
of  Model 1 since it gives a lower AIC value. Therefore, the following 
interpretations and the hypothesis analyses are based on Model 2.
In Appendix 2, Model 2 shows that most observed variables 
measure their four latent variables very well. First, all the factor loadings of  
fundamentalism are statistically significant.  For example, the coefficient 
of   Fundamentalism → F4 (.838) can be interpreted that holding other 
variables constant, with every one unit increase in the latent variable of  
fundamentalism,  the value of  F3 will increase about .838 units, and it 
is statistically significant with p < .000. Second, all the factor loadings 
of  Trust in Government are also statistically significant. For example, 
the coefficient of  Trust → T7 (1.441) tells that holding other variables 
constant, with every one unit increase in Trust, the score of  T7 will 
increase about 1.441 units. 
Third, four of  five factor loadings of  Efficacy (political efficacy) 
are statistically significant. Only one of  them, namely item Ef4, is not 
statistically significant, which means that item Ef4 is different from the 
other items measuring Efficacy, or it does not measure the latent variable 
of  political efficacy. Lastly, all factor loadings of  Violence (violent 
attitudes) are statistically significant. For example, the coefficient of  
Violence → V4 (.956) tells that holding other variables constant, with 
one unit increase in the latent variable of  Violence, the V4 will increase 
by .956 units. It is statistically significant with p < .000. 
As for the relationships between Violence (violent attitudes) and 
other variables, Model 2 (in Appendix 2) shows that Fundamentalism 
and Fungroup (latent interaction of  Fundamentaslim and Group) are 
significantly associated with Violence. However, Trust, Efficacy and 
Efftrust (latent interaction of  Efficacy and Trust) are not significantly 
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associated with Violence. Additionally, the group’s differences in the 
latent variable of  Fundamentalism, Trust and Violence vary inconsistently 
between FPI and the nonviolent groups. The coefficients of  these 
relationships are interpreted as follows.
The coefficient of  1.053 (Fundamentalism → Violence) tells 
that, holding other variables constant, with every one unit increase in 
Fundamentalism, Violence will increase about 1.053 units. It is statistically 
significant with p < .000. The coefficient of  1.61 (Group → Violence) 
tells that holding other variables constant, FPI will have a higher mean 
of  about 1.61 units for Violence than that of  the nonviolent groups. It 
is statistically significant with p < .000. The coefficient of  the interaction 
between latent variable Fundamentalism and Group (or Fungroup) is 
statistically significant with a path coefficient of  -.918. It cannot be 
directly interpreted. Therefore, the coefficient of  -.918 should be put in 
the formula as follows:
Violence = bviolence.group + bviolence.fundamentslim + bviolence.fungroup
Violence = 1.61 + 1.053 + (-0.918)
For the Nonviolent Groups: Muhammadiyah and NU (Group = 0) 
Violence = 1.61(0) + 1.053 - 0.918 (0) 
Violence = 1.053
For the Violent Group, FPI (Group = 1)
Violence = 1.61(1) + 1.053 - 0.918(1) 
Violence = 1.745
Thus, this significant interaction effect indicates that, holding 
other variables constant, the more fundamentalist people are, the more 
likely they are to have violent attitude. However, this relationship is 
moderated by Group, which means that FPI has steeper slope than that 
of  the nonviolent groups (the slope for the nonviolent groups = 1.053 
and FPI = 1.74), or in other words, fundamentalism for the activists 
of  FPI has a stronger effect on violence than that for the activists of  
Muhammadiyah and NU.
The coefficient of  .592 (Trust → Violence), .072 (Efficacy 
→Violence) and .183 (Efftrust → Violence) are statistically insignificant. 
The first two values tell that trust in government (Trust) and political 
efficacies (Efficacy) are not associated with violent attitudes (Violence). 
Similarly, the insignificant interaction between Efficacy and Trust (or 
Efftrust) also tells that a person who has low trust in government and 
higher political efficacy is not likely to be more violent.
In relation to the differences between FPI and the nonviolent 
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groups in the latent variables Fundamentalism, Trust and Efficacy, the 
coefficient of  1.976 (Group → Fundamentalism) tells that FPI tends to be 
more fundamentalist by about 1.976 than that of  the nonviolent groups. 
It is statistically significant with p < .000. The coefficient of  -.036 (Group 
→ Trust) tells that FPI is likely to have less trust in government by about 
.036 than that of  the nonviolent groups. It is statistically significant with 
p < .05. Lastly, the coefficient of  -.003 (Group → Efficacy) tells that FPI 
is likely to have less political efficacy than that of  the nonviolent groups 
by about .003 but it is statistically not significant. This means that FPI 
and the nonviolent groups have the same level of  political efficacy.
Finally, based on this result, this Hypothesized Model (Model 2) 
may be modified by dropping the latent variables of  Trust, Efficacy 
and their interactions (Efftrust). As suggested by Kline, at least there 
are two reasons that should be fulfilled for dropping variables from the 
model: empirical and theoretical reasons.33  First, empirically based on 
the estimations in Model 1 and Model 2, the latent variable of  Trust and 
Efficacy fail to explain the latent variable Violence (violent attitude). 
Second, theoretically most social movement studies suggest that social 
movement is about “collective challenges” and it is mostly about outside 
state institutions seeking to forward or halt social change. Therefore, 
whether or not a social movement adopts violent strategies, social 
movement actors will be likely to have a high political efficacy and a low 
trust in government.  In short, the interaction between political efficacy 
(high) and trust in government (low) may explain only the emergence 
of  social movements, not the adoptions of  violent strategies by social 
movements. Then, the maximum likelihood estimation of  this modified 
model can be seen in Appendix 2 “Model 3.” 
The summary of  the hypothesis testing can be explained as follows:
 ● Hypothesis 1a (the more fundamentalist people are, the more likely 
they will justify violence) is supported by the data. There is a significant 
relationship between fundamentalism and violent attitude with a path 
coefficient of  1.053. This relationship indicates that people who are 
more fundamentalist –regardless of  their religious affiliations– are 
more likely to justify the use of  violent means. 
 ● Hypothesis 1b (the activists of  the non violent group will be less 
likely to be fundamentalist than those of  violent group) is supported 
by the data. There is a significant difference between FPI (coded 1) 
33 Rex B. Kline, Principles and Practice of  Structural Equation Modeling (New York: 
Guilford Press, 2005).2005
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and the nonviolent groups, or Muhammadiyah acnd NU (coded 0) 
in fundamentalism with a coefficient of  1.976.  This indicates that 
the activists of  the violent group (FPI) are more fundamentalist than 
those of  the nonviolent groups
 ● Hypothesis 1c (the relationship between fundamentalism and violence 
will be stronger for the activist of  the violent group than those of  
the non violent group) is supported by the data. There is a significant 
interaction between latent variables fundamentalism and group on 
violence with a path coefficient of  -.918.  Computing this number in 
the model, the path coefficient of  fundamentalism on violence for 
the nonviolent groups (coded 0) is 1.053 and the path coefficient for 
FPI (coded 1) is 1.745. This indicates that FPI has a steeper slope in 
the relationship between Fundamentalism and Violence than that of  
the nonviolent groups.
 ● Hypothesis 2a  (people who have lower trust in government will 
be more likely to justify violence) is not supported by the data. The 
relationship between Trust and Violence with a path coefficient of  
.592 is statistically not significant. This indicates that people with 
lower trust in government are not more likely to justify the use of  
violent means.
 ● Hypothesis 2b (people who have low trust in government but high 
political efficacy will be likely to justify violence) is not supported 
by the data. The interaction effect between the variables Trust 
and Efficacy (Efftrust) with the coefficient of  0.183 is statistically 
not significant. This indicates that people who have low trust in 
government and high political efficacy will not be likely to justify the 
use of  violent means.
 ● Hypothesis 2c (the activists of  Muhammadiyah and NU will be likely 
to have a higher trust in government than those of  FPI) is likely 
supported by the data. There is a statistically significant difference 
of  the conditional mean of  Trust between FPI and the nonviolent 
groups with the coefficient of  -.036. This indicates that the activists 
of   FPI will be likely to have a lower trust in government than those 
of  the nonviolent groups. However, the difference value is very small 
(.036 point). This may also be interpreted that both of  them have very 
low trust in government. 
 ● Hypothesis 2d (the activists of  Muhammadiyah and NU will be likely 
to have a lower political efficacy than those of  FPI) is not supported 
by the data. The relationship between the observed variable Group and 
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the latent variable Trust with the coefficient of  .003 is not significant. 
This indicates that the scores of  political efficacy for the activist of  
FPI and the nonviolent groups are about the same.
D. Concluding Remarks
There are various perspectives of  looking at political violence, and 
there is no single answer to the question of  why this violence occurs. Some 
scholars look at the aspects of  political environment, organization and 
actors to explain political violence.  Political approach suggests that the 
characteristics of  regimes or states are considered to be more determining 
of  social movement’s outcomes than other environmental factors, or 
more over the characteristics of  the actors. In this light, authoritarianism 
or state repression is often considered to be the cause of  the emergence 
of  violent movements.
Unlike the above approach, other scholars focus on exogenous 
factors to explain violent movements, especially the organizational 
aspects of  the movement. These includes culture, meaning construction, 
ideology of  the movements. For example, many social movement scholars 
argue that political violence is mainly symbolic. Therefore, in analyzing 
violence, cultural and emotional effects are more important than the 
material damage caused by violence.
The present study discusses the causal analysis of  religious violence 
based neither on political process nor organizational aspects. This mainly 
focus on individual aspects of  the activists of  the movements. By using 
a quantitative (structural equation modeling) approach, the study tests 
the association between dependent variable of  violence (justification on 
the use of  violent means) and independent variables: fundamentalism, 
trust in government, political efficacy and latent interaction of  trust and 
efficacy. The relationship between violence and fundamentalism is also 
controlled by the variable of  group (the group that was often considered 
to be violent and nonviolent).
The result of  the study confirms that fundamentalism is positively 
associated with violence (justification on the use of  violent means). 
Even though, this association clearly depicts that the activists of  FPI 
have a stronger association in the relationship between fundamentalism 
and violence than those of  the nonviolent groups (Muhammadiyah and 
NU), the positive relationship between fundamentalism and violence is 
statistically obvious regardless of  their group affiliation. 
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On the other hand, this study does not support the argument 
regarding a relationship between trust in government and violence. This 
is because most of  respondents have very low trust in government but 
at the same time they vary in their tendency on the use of  violent means. 
This means that both respondents, who are violent (FPI) and not violent 
(the nonviolent groups), have low trust in government. Even though 
the group comparison on the latent variable of  Trust between FPI and 
the nonviolent groups is statistically significant, this study contends that 
they have very low trust in government. The scores of  both groups are 
concentrated in the range of  one (never) and two (rarely), where FPI 
scores lie in the lower range and the nonviolent groups’ score lie in the 
upper range.
In short, in the context of  social movements, trust does not relate 
to movements’ adoption of  violence. This may be because by definition 
a social movement is a challenger of  authority, and therefore, activists 
in social movements, whether they adopt violent means or not, should 
have low trust in government.
Similarly, the latent interaction between trust and political efficacy 
is not supported by the data. This means that the respondents who have 
low trust in government and high political efficacy does not necessarily 
means that they will be likely to justify the use of  violent means. Both 
the activists of  the violent group (FPI) and the activists of  nonviolent 
groups have the same level of  distrust in government and mid-levels-
political efficacy.
Interestingly, only the latent variable fundamentalism sheds light 
on the causal model of  violence. This confirms that religion (type of  
religiosity) influences the way people think and act. Religion contains 
values and rules; it determines which one is wrong and right, ethical and 
non-ethical, and who are friends and enemies; finally it potentially shapes 
the way people behave and act. In relation to this case, it can be said that 
types of  religiosity, such as fundamentalism, moderation and liberalism, 
of  the activists shape the dynamics of  religious social movements, 
especially the strategy (violence or nonviolence) that they adopt to pursue 
their goals. As result, this study suggests that fundamentalism, a type of  
religiosity, can be a seed of  religious violence. Therefore, understanding 
fundamentalism is important in designing a strategy of  deterring religious 
violence, or any forms of  radicalism and extremism.
Last but not least, the result of  the study appears to contradict 
the arguments of  Bruinessen, Jahroni and Al-Zastrouw who argue 
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that fundamentalism is not associated with violence and radicalism. 
This different argument may stems from the different approach and 
concept being used in defining fundamentalism, or interpretation on the 
operational concept of  fundamentalism. This study strictly implements 
the operational concept from Frey,34 which emphasizes not only the aspect 
of  belief  but also the manifestation of  belief  in social and political lives 
(observed variables to measure scale of  fundamentaslim). In addition, 
this study employs a quantitative approach, which strictly applies 
quantitative rules in the analysis of  the relationship between violence 
and fundamentalism, such as the concept of  “ceteris paribus” or holding 
other independent variables or factors constant. On the other hand, other 
studies, which disagree with the relationship between fundamentalism 
and violence, use a broader concept of  fundamentalism (than those being 
used in the current study) and employ a qualitative approach.
34 Frey, Fundamentalism, 
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Appendix 1 Hypothesized Model   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
Note: rectangle = observed variable, oval = latent variable, and circle = error terms (E and D) 
The dashed lines are the interaction between two variables  
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Trust  → T7 1.567* 0.654 
 
1.441* 0.593 
 
  
         Efficacy  → Ef1 1a 0 
 
1a 0 
 
  
Efficacy  → Ef2 0.597*** 0.061 
 
0.6*** 0.072 
 
  
Efficacy  → Ef3 0.587*** 0.056 
 
0.59*** 0.06 
 
  
Efficacy  → Ef4 0.076 0.06 
 
0.078 0.076 
 
  
Efficacy  → Ef5 0.894*** 0.074 
 
0.9*** 0.085 
 
  
Efficacy  → Ef6 0.376*** 0.067 
 
0.378*** 0.078 
 
  
         Violence  → V1 1a 0 
 
1a 0 
 
1a 0 
Violence  → V2 0.983*** 0.056 
 
0.983*** 0.049 
 
0.988*** 0.046 
Violence  → V3 0.876*** 0.048 
 
0.873*** 0.044 
 
0.881*** 0.042 
Violence  → V4 0.941*** 0.047 
 
0.956*** 0.041 
 
1.007*** 0.039 
Violence  → V5 0.893*** 0.049 
 
0.91*** 0.052 
 
0.984*** 0.054 
Violence  → V6 0.849*** 0.055 
 
0.879*** 0.06 
 
1.079*** 0.047 
         Fundamentalism → Violence   0.803*** 0.072 
 
1.053*** 0.095 
 
0.979*** 0.095 
Trust → Violence   -1.62 1.042 
 
0.592 0.942 
 
  
Efficacy →Violence   0.089 0.049 
 
0.072 0.058 
 
  
Fungroup → Violence   
 
-0.918*** 0.127 
 
-0.893*** 0.095 
Efftrust  → Violence   
 
0.183 0.934 
 
  
         Group → Fundamentalism  1.973*** 0.167 
 
1.976*** 0.149 
 
1.963*** 0.149 
Group → Trust  -0.032* 0.016 
 
-0.036* 0.018 
 
  
Group → Efficacy  -0.005 0.162 
 
-0.003 0.158 
 
  
Group → Violence  0.227 0.165 
 
1.61*** 0.198 
 
1.717*** 0.129 
 
Note: Model 1: hypothesized model without interactions, Model 2: full hypothesized 
model, and Model 3: modified model.
Fungroup is the interaction between Fundamentalism and Group.
Efftrust is the interaction between Efficacy and Trust.
aNot tested for significance; *p < .05     **p < .01 ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests)
Appendix 2: Maximum likelihood Parameter Estimates of  the Models
